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Knight: Blockchain Jenga: The Challenges of Blockchain Discovery and Admi

NOTE
BLOCKCHAIN JENGA: THE CHALLENGES OF
BLOCKCHAIN DISCOVERY AND ADMISSIBILITY
UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
I.

INTRODUCflON

Blockchain is one of the greatest inventions of the modem world
since the inception of ARPAnet in the late 1960s. 1 Initially created to
withstand a nuclear war, ARPAnet was the earliest form of the Internet,
allowing for the transmission of data packets between computers. 2 Over
the course of several decades, innovation flourished in the technology
sector, each development contributing to the framework needed for the
operation of a blockchain . 3 Each of these contributing innovations did
not necessarily revolve around money; however, they enabled the
inventor of Bitcoin to develop a working model of distributed ledger
technology.' Although originally intended for monetary transactions,
blockchain technology has a vast array of other applications, some of
which are still undiscovered. The implementation of blockchain across
business will bring a host of questions relating to its discoverability and
admissibility in federal courts. 6 The solution to this issue revolves
around amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence,
and playing blockchain Jenga with cross-chain technology.'
This Note is not a discussion on Bitcoin; rather, this Note uses
Bitcoin's underlying protocol as a tool to explain the complexities of
blockchain, as Bitcoin is one of the many examples of blockchain's data

1. See ANURAG BANA & MAXINE VIERTMANN, INT'L BAR Ass'N, THE NOT-So-DISTANT
FUTURE: BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 3 (2017); PRIMAVERA DE FLIPPI & AARON
wRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF CODE 13-14 (2018).
2. DE FILIPPI& WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 13-14.

3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra Part I.
5.

See BANA & VIERTMANN, supra note 1, at 16; Garry Gabison, Policy Considerationsfor

the Blockchain Technology Public and Private Applications, 19 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 327,
329 (2016); infra Part II.
6.
7.

See infra Part H.
See infra Part IV.
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capabilities.8 This Note is broken-up into three distinct sections: Part
II-outlining the basics of blockchain and electronic evidence; Part 11discussing the issues the private sector may face when preparing for civil
litigation after implementing distributed ledger technology; and Part
IV-suggesting a two-part solution for the legal issues brought about by
the emergence of the blockchain. 9
II.

BLOCKCHAIN & ESI LITIGATION: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

This Part provides a historical overview of blockchain, electronic
discovery ("e-discovery"), and electronic evidence, and serves as a
technical guide for distributed ledger technology. Subpart A discusses
the technological breakthroughs throughout history that led to the
emergence of blockchain, as well as how the technology has evolved
since the start of Bitcoin in 2009.11 Subpart B discusses the technicalities
of blockchain, including: how blockchain works; the different types of
blockchain; how to achieve authentication, consensus, and immutability;
the relevant actors in a blockchain; and other technical terms.12 In
Subpart C, this Note discusses the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
("FRCP") pertaining to discovery, as well as the Federal Rules of
Evidence ("FRE") pertaining to admissibility. 3
A.

The Origin and Evolution of Blockchain

14
The idea of a decentralized ledger is not a relatively new concept.
Throughout the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries,
technologists have been developing the underlying parts that makeup
blockchain technology.15 These components that create a blockchain
consist of (1) authentication, which is provided by public key
cryptography;16 (2) a consensus mechanism, which is coded into the
protocol; and (3) immutability, which is created through "proof-ofwork." 17 This Subpart discusses the technical advances that contribute to

8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Parts II-IV.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part I.A.
12. See infra Part I.B.
13. See infra Part I.C.
14. White Paper:A Next-GenerationSmart Contractand DecentralizedApplication Platform,
GITHUB, https://github.com/ethereum/wikilwikilWhite-Paper (last updated June 17, 2019)
[hereinafter White Paper].
15. See DE FILPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 14-20.
16. See generally id. at 14-16 (discussing the history of public-private key encryption and
digital signatures). This Note will not be discussing the creation of cryptography.
17. See JANE ELLIS ET AL., INT'L BAR Ass'N, BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY: IS IT BUILDING A
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the distributed ledger technology seen today, as well as its evolution and
various applications.18
1. Origin of Blockchain: Technologic Failures and the Bitcoin
Solution
Blockchain technology, specifically, the idea of distributed ledger
technology used for digital currency, is not a new concept.1 9 E-cash
protocols based on anonymity have existed since the 1980s.20 These
protocols ran on Chaumian blinding, a primitive cryptographic
language; 2 1 despite the high level of privacy they provided to its users,
these
protocols
failed
due
to
"their
reliance
on
a
centralizedintermediary."22
One of the forces for cryptology development was known as the
Cypherpunks mailing list, which first presented the "blueprint" for a
cryptocurrency in the early 1990s.23 Tim May, one of the founders of
Cypherpunks, compiled the mailing list with crypto-anarchists 24 that
would disseminate the concept of crypto-anarchy, which is "the use of
cryptography to facilitate private contractual ordering, promote
individual liberty, and dismantle the nation-state" in order to call
attention to the government suppressing "popular cryptography." 25 Both
May's manifesto and the government's regulations surrounding the
newly-created Internet caused many crypto-anarchists to fear
government suppression through innovation-limitation and surveillance,
with the only course of resistance being encryption. 2 6
While on a crypto-list, Adam Back hypothesized a method of
validating email and other transactions via computational puzzles.27

BRIGHTER FUTtURE? 21 (2017). The "proof-of-work" was the glue that brought the consensus
protocol and public key cryptography together to form the blockchain. Id.; see infra notes 33, 95,
100-01 and accompanying text.

18. See infra Part I.A.
19.

See White Paper, supranote 14.

20. Id.
21. Id.; see DE FLIPI & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 19. The protocol used public-private
cryptographic keys to validate transactions and execute digital signatures called blind signatures
(invented and named by David Chaum) that would be associated with the exchange of the digital
currency. Id.
22. White Paper,supra note 14.
23. Jake Goldenfein & Dan Hunter, Blockchains, Orphan Works, and the Public Domain, 41
COLUM. J.L. ARTS. 1, 6 (2017).
24. Id. "Crypto-anarchists" are members of the technology world that discuss the idea of a
digitalized monetary system independent of the government. Id. at 5-6.

25. Id. at 6.
26. Id.
27. See Adam Back, Hashcash - A Denial of Service Counter-Measure,HASHCASH (Aug. 1,
2002), http://www.hashcash.org/papers/hashcash.pdf; Posting of Adam Back, owner-cypherpunks@
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These puzzles, known as "Hashcash" were intended to prevent the
remailer"
emails.29
uninhibited sending and receipt of spam and
Hashcash uses digital postage to prove that the user is not a spammer
based on the amount of central processing unit ("CPU") time used to
calculate the stamp before sending the email.30 As a reward for their
CPU expenditure, Hashcash also contemplated the idea of a monetary
incentive based in DigiCash.31 This process 32 eventually led to the
development of a similar computational puzzle method known
as "proof-of-work."

33

The closest relative of the well-known Bitcoin was posted to
Cypherpunks on November 27, 1998.34 A man known as Wei Dai
proposed a new network encryption protocol, inspired by May's views,
that would create a decentralized extra-governmental monetary system
called "b-money." 3 5 B-money worked similarly to Bitcoin in that it was

based on a decentralized network, consisting of an authoritative and
permanent ledger that would verify and hold the actual value of all
transactions made on the ledger, while simultaneously generating more
b-money (value) via the computational process required to solve the
protocol's encryption.36 In other words, Dai proposed a new network that
would exist in a decentralized manner that allowed a user to create
money by solving puzzles.3 7
The twenty-first century brought on a new wave of interconnected
technology known as peer-to-peer ("P2P") networks, the most notable
being Napster. 3 8 Unlike a modern P2P network, Napster was not fully
decentralized and relied on a centralized database that provided a more
user-friendly experience.3 Following a series of disastrous legal
decisions holding Napster liable for copyright infringement for
toad.com, to cypherpunks@toad.com (Mar. 28, 1997, 4:52 AM), www.hashcash.org/papers/announ
ce.txt [hereinafter Posting of Adam Back].

28.

Remailer is "[a] service that anonymously forwards email so as to disguise the original

sender." Remailer, OXFORD U. PRESS, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/remailer (last

visited Jan. 25, 2020).
29.

See Posting of Adam Back, supra note 27.

30.

See id.

31. See id.; supra note 27; see also Back, supra note 27.
32. It is important to note that Back was not the only innovator in this area. See Back, supra
note 27 (discussing prior works of other innovators).
33. See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCoIN,

https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
34.

Goldenfein & Hunter, supra note 23, at 6-7; White Paper, supra note 14.

35. Goldenfein & Hunter, supra note 23, at 7.
36. See id.
37. White Paper,supra note 14.
38.

DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 17.

39. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol48/iss2/8
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maintaining this database, Napster was forced to eliminate any
copyrighted material from its network, causing its users to leave and
Napster to dissolve.4
Although an unfortunate ending for Napster, the issues presented by
centralization sparked a flow of innovation that led to the secondgeneration P2P networks that functioned solely on a decentralized
basis.41 The two most notable early twenty-first century P2P networks
were known as Gnutella and BitTorrent. 42 These ran on decentralized
databases and focused on different methods of file storage, thereby
eliminating the problem Napster faced and limiting their
respectiveliabilities.43
After other developments in the underlying blockchain technology
failed to create an actual blockchain," an anonymous developer, or
group of developers, known by the pseudonym "Satoshi Nakamoto,"
published a whitepaper in August 2008 that described "a system of
'purely peer-to-peer electronic cash,' which could be controlled outright
by the holder, and sent to anybody without needing a bank's permission
or running the risk of confiscation." 4 5 This system is known as Bitcoin
and is considered a fundamental development in money and currency, as
it is the "first example of a digital asset which simultaneously has no
backing or intrinsic value and no centralized issuer or controller." 46
Bitcoin combined the concepts of decentralized file storage implemented
by second-generation P2P networks, DigiCash's cryptographic
encryption,
b-money's
consensus methods,
and Hashcash's
computational puzzle solving via CPU energy to resolve the
fundamental question its protocol predecessors faced in their
applications: How does one create a functioning P2P network that allows
for online transactions between untrusting strangers without the need for
a trusted third-party intermediary?4 7
Bitcoin operates on a network of computers that allows users that
create pseudonymous accounts via public-private key cryptography to
send and receive Bitcoin to other users around the world. 4 8 When a user
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id. at 17-18.
See generally id. at 17-19 (discussing the specifics ofGnutella ad BitTorret).
Id.

44.
45.

See White Paper,supra note 14.
Gov'T OFFICE FOR SCI., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN 33,

43 (2016); Gabison, supranote 5, at 327.
46. Goldenfein & Hunter, supra note 23, at 7; White Paper,supra note 14.
47. DE FILIPPI& WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 20; Gabison, supra note 5, at 327; White Paper,
supra note 14.
48. See DE FILIPPI &WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 21.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 8

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

524

[Vol. 48:519

seeks to transact, the user must first digitally "sign" the transaction with
a private key before the network can validate and record the transaction
across the system.4 9 These records are stored on Bitcoin's blockchain,
which follows the Bitcoin protocol-an open-source software." In
January 2009, Nakamoto tested their hypothetical Bitcoin Protocol and
mined the first set of Bitcoins known as the "genesis block." However,
this technology is not infinitely-lasting; only twenty-one million
Bitcoins are programmed into the protocol, and so it is therefore
designed to last until 2140.52
2. Evolution of Blockchain Technology: Beyond Bitcoin
Bitcoin did more than create a network of computers that allowed
users to transfer digital money instantly and anonymously without the
need for trust; 5 3 it created a system for the hosting of values based on a
distributed consensus.5 As Bitcoin's popularity grew, the understanding
of the underlying distributed ledger technology soon followed, and its
application possibilities became seemingly-endless compared to that of
Bitcoin. 5 Investments in blockchain technology have increased
exponentially since 2012 and continue to rise.5 6 As of 2018, about $2.1
billion was spent on blockchain technology worldwide; this growth is
said to reach $176 billion by 2025 and over $3 trillion by 2030.
Additionally, seventy-four percent of top executives believe that
blockchain may be beneficial in the ordinary course of business, thirtyfour percent of those executives stated that their company had already
begun the implementation of a blockchain, and forty-one percent plan on
using the technology within the next year.5 Generally, the broader
applications include smart contracts, information sharing and file

49.
50.
51.
note 23,

Id.
Id.
Id. at 26. "Genius Block" is Bitcoin's first block. See id.; Goldenfein & Hunter, supra
at 7. Nakamoto relinquished their Bitcoin responsibilities in 2010 when they handed over

the ledger to Gavin Andresen, who was charged with the duty to update the software regularly, as
any software would need to be. See GOV'T OFFICE FOR SC., supra note 45, at 43.
52. See DE FILIPPI& WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 26.
53. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text; infra note 54 and accompanying text.
54. See White Paper,supra note 14; see also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
55. White Paper,supra note 14.
56. See Mark Fenwick et al., Legal Education in the Blockchain Revolution, 20 VAND. J.ENT.
& TECH. L.351, 372 (2017); infra note 58 and accompanying text.
57. See COMPTIA ADVOCACY, HARNESSING THE BLOCKCHAN REVOLUTION: COMPTIA's
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR 1, 10 (2018).

58.

See id. at 1.
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storage, finance and banking, and Decentralized Autonomous
Organizations("DAO").59
The ability to use blockchain protocol to construct a system of rules
that "create order without law and implement what can be thought of as
a private regulatory framework" is referred to as lex cyptographica.1
Smart contracts are the computerized version of contracts-they are
"computer algorithms that embed the terms and conditions of a contract
as source code that is compiled into bytecode and injected into the
blockchain." 6 1 Rather than relying on the contracting parties acting in
good faith, a smart contract, which is the equivalent to a legal contract,
takes the need for trust-and for courts-out of the equation.62 This is
due to the fact that smart contracts on a blockchain can be designed to be
fully or partially self-executing or self-enforcing-the coded protocol
allows for the automatic operation of the contract terms, even between
anonymous parties. 6 3For example, if Amy and Bob execute a smart
contract where they agree that Amy must complete a task before Bob
transfers Amy a predetermined amount of money, when the condition of
Amy completing the task is met, the blockchain will verify the
transaction, and the money will be automatically transferred from Bob to
Amy without the need for a third-party intermediary." However, if Amy
does not complete the task in accordance with the terms, a code error is
registered, and the contract will not execute.65
The idea of a "smart contract" was first considered by Nick Szabo
in 1997,66 but did not become a reality until mid-2015, when Vitalik
Buterin released Ethereum-the first smart contract blockchain-based
system. 67 Ethereum is very similar to Bitcoin, but its purpose is to
facilitate more than financial transactions by allowing users to customize
their interactions for a variety of applications.68
The technological advancements throughout the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries led to the distributed ledger technology seen

59. See, e.g., BANA & VIERTMANN, supra note 1, at 6-14; DE FLIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note
1, at ch. 3-10; White Paper, supra note 14.
60. DE FtLIPPi & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 5.
61. VICTORIA L. LEMIEUX, BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY FOR RECORDKEEPING: HELP OR
HYPE? 14 (2016).
62. Id.; see GOV'T OFFICE FOR SCI., supranote 45, at 18.
63. COMPTIA ADVOCACY, supra note 57, at 28; LEMIEUX, supra note 61, at 14.
64. ELLIS ET AL., supra note 17, at 7.
65. BANA & VIERTMANN, supra note 1, at 6.
66. See Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks, FIRST
MONDAY (Sept. 1, 1997), http://ojphi.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469.
67. DE FIuPPi & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 27-28 n.77.
68. Id.; see infra Part II.B.2.c.
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today. 69 The consensus mechanism envisioned by Adam Back, the P2P
network protocols shaped by Napster, and the cryptography proposed by
Wei Dai enabled Nakamoto to create and implement one of the most
notable monetary transaction protocols of the twenty-first century, and
more importantly, put blockchain to use.7 0
B.

Blockchain: How It Works

In its most basic form, a blockchain is akin to software like macOS
Mojave or Windows 10, in that it can be manipulated to serve the user's
needs." This is the extent to which a blockchain is similar to the
software ran on a computer, as a blockchain is unique 2This Subpart
discusses the basics relating to distributed ledger technology, as well as
the different types of blockchains.7 3 Additionally, this Subpart takes an
in-depth approach to the function of a blockchain, including the actors in
a blockchain, the role of miners, Ethereum, and forks.74
1. Basics
As there is no universal definition for blockchain, the best way to
understand the technology is to break it down by its elements; thus, it is
a "shared digital ledger or database that maintains a continuously
growing list of transactions among participating parties regarding digital
assets-together described as 'blocks."' 7 5 These transactions are
recorded and timestamped accordingly. 7 More simply, a blockchain can
be thought of as a giant Excel spreadsheet, shared with all of the users,
that permanently and anonymously records transactions occurring

world-wide.7
71
There are two types of blockchains: (1) public and (2) private. A
public blockchain is exactly what it sounds like-a blockchain that can
be used by anyone who has a computer with access to the Internet and

69. See supra Part HA.1.
70. See generally Nakamoto, supra note 33 (explaining how each innovation led to putting
blockchain in use).
71. See supra Part I.A.2.
72. See supra Part H.A.2.
73. See infra Part I.B.1.
74. See infra Part I.B.2.
75. See Fenwick et al., supra note 56, at 364-66.
76. See Shaan Ray, The Difference Between Blockchains & DistributedLedger Technology,
TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Feb. 19, 2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/the-difference-betweenblockchains-distributed-ledger-technology-42715a0fa92.
77. See Fenwick et al., supra note 56, at 364-65.
78. See Asking Permission: What's the Difference Between a Public and PrivateBlockchain?,
SMITH & CROWN (July 21, 2016), https://www.smithandcrown.com/perrnission-blockchains.
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some technical knowledge.79 There is no need for registering with a
central database in order to use, build, or download a public blockchain
due to its open-source code.s0 Public blockchains are completely
decentralized in that the network exists on thousands of computers
without the need for a central authority-the users of which are
completely anonymous." Every user is able to contribute information to
the blockchain and hold an identical copy of the ledger-there is no one
owner. 82 Conversely, private blockchains, which exist on a limited
number of computers, are only able to be utilized by those users who
have permission to do so. 8 3 These users are granted access by a
centralized authority-an owner or group of owners-who may place
certain limitations on the user. 84 As a consequence, users are not
completely anonymous."

2. Making the Chain
Given that a blockchain is a ledger in its simplest form, the process
for entering information into the blockchain follows a specific process in
order to achieve (1) authentication, (2) consensus, and (3)
immutability. 86 This Subpart discusses the process of creating a block,
storing information on a block, the role of miners, Ethereum, smart
contracts, and forks.7
a. The Beginnings
The process of recording a single transaction on a blockchain starts
when a user performs a transaction*88 Users have a combination of public
and private cryptographic keys that allow them to transact.89 Private keys
are only known by the individual user himself and grant him access to
his wallet, while public keys are shared with the network and enable
anonymous P2P transactions by providing an address and a digital

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82.
83.
84.

See Gov'T OFFICE FOR SCI, supra note 45, at 17.
See LEMIIEUX, supra note 61, at n.14.
See DE FLPPI& WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 31.

85. Id.
86.

See ELLIS ET AL., supra note 17, at 21; supra note 17 and accompanying text.

87. See infra Part H.B.2.
88. See Scott J. Shackelford & Steve Myers, Block-by-Block: Leveraging the Power of
Blockchain Technology to Build Trust and Promote Cyber Peace, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 334, 343
(2017).
89. See id. at 344-45.
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signature.90 That transaction is then encrypted and sent to the network of
nodes. 91 Nodes are computers that comprise the blockchain network and
"store exact or nearly exact copies of a blockchain and coordinate by
using a software protocol." 9 2 Once the transaction reaches the network,
miners begin the process of mining for a new block.9 Miners are
participants in the blockchain that work to solve computational puzzles
in exchange for monetary rewards, and they help to achieve consensus. 94
For example, Bitcoin miners create consensus by: "1) taking as input the
transactions individuals send them; 2) verifying transactions for
syntactic correctness, valid signatures, and sufficient funds; 3) pooling
correct transactions into a transaction block; 4) performing a proof-ofwork to legitimize the transaction block; and 5) broadcasting the results
to the community." 95
b. The Miners' Role
In order to validate the transactions, miners have to: (1) determine
that the correct party created the transaction, which is done by validating
the digital signature associated with the transaction; (2) determine
whether that party has enough digital currency (if applicable), which is
verified by looking at transaction history; and (3) ensure that there is no
double spending.9 6 Once verified by the miner, the transaction is
automatically inscribed to the proposed block."
At the same time, miners have to add blocks for the transaction to
be stored.98A block is a package of transactions that contains a list of all
new transactions, a hash of the previous block, a timestamp, and a
nonce. 99 In order to form a new block under the proof-of-work method,
miners have to solve increasingly difficult computational puzzles by
coming up with a sixty-four-digit hexadecimal (that is, a hash) number
90. See id. at 345.
91. See id. at 343-44.
92.

See DE FLIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 2.

93. See Shackelford & Myers, supra note 88, at 343-44, 346.
94. See DE FILIPPI& WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 220 n.64; Shackelford & Myers, supra note
88, at 346.
95. See Shackelford & Myers, supra note 88, at 346.
96. See id. at 344, 345-46.
97. See id. at 346.
98. See White Paper,supra note 14.
99. See Miles Vaughn & Jason R. Baron, Private and Secure Records: Distributed Ledger
Technology as a Record Keeping Mechanism by the SEC, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 23, 2017),
https://www.faegredrinker.com/-/media/files/insights db/publications/2018/04/private-and-secure
White Paper,
records.pdfla=en&hash-4A325A68F5C26566EDD1951D672D2859E71A4AO;
supra note 14. A nonce is defined as "a number assigned to the block based on the block's hash."
Vaughn & Baron, supra.
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that is less than or equal to the target hash set in the current block
0
proposed. 1 0 The
only way to do this is through trial and error, as the
target hash is coded to be random and completely unpredictable.10 1
A hash' 02 is made up of a series of characters that can represent the
details from all of the previous transactions recorded on the blockchain,
as well as the hash of the previous block.' The hash represents the
proof-of-work for the miner and the validity of the current and previous
transactions for the network. 0 4 Hashes are created via the "hashing
algorithm"-which takes a random input of data and encodes it into a
fixed output size that is completely unique.' Once information is
hashed, even the slightest change to the data will result in an entirely
new hash. 1 06 Note that hashing is a one-way street-once data is hashed,
it cannot be un-hashed.

07

Miners, in attempting to verify the transactions, are contributing
computing power to the network, for which they are offered incentives
such as Bitcoin currency.'" Bitcoin is coded to create a new block every
ten minutes, during which any given number of miners are using their
computing power in an attempt to validate transactions while mining for
the new block.1 09 Calculating the target hash does not automatically
create a new block; instead, when the first miner does so, he is awarded
a monetary incentive and the right to add it to the chain.no The other
miners continue to contribute power to the network by solving the
puzzle and verifying transactions until the ten-minute period is complete

100. See Adam Hayes, How Does Bitcoin Mining Work?, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/tech/how-does-bitcoin-mining-work.
101. See White Paper, supra note 14.
102. See Brian Curran, What Is a Merkle Tree? Beginner's Guide to This Blockchain
Component, BLOCKONOMI (July 9, 2018), https:/iblockonomi.com/merkle-tree. A Bitcoin Hash

looks like this: "b09a57d476ea01c7f91756adffld560e579057ac99a28d3f30e259b30ecc9dc7".
id.

See

103.
104.
105.

Fenwick et al., supra note 56, at 367.
See LEMIEUX, supra note 61, at 26 n.61.
Curran, supra note 102.

106.
107.

Id.
See @drjimbob, If Hashing Is One Way, Why Can We Decrypt MD5 Hashes?, STACK

EXCHANGE (June 29, 2013, 6:22 PM), https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/38141/ifhashing-is-one-way-why-can-we-decrypt-md5-hashes. In theory, it can be un-hashed; however,
decrypting a forty-two-character MD5 hash, for example, would use an infinite amount of energy
and take forever to do so. Id.
108. See Hayes, supra note 100. In June 2019, "the reward for completing a block [was] 12.5

Bitcoin. In February 2019, the price of Bitcoin was about $3,500 per Bitcoin, which means you'd
earn (12.5 x 3,500)=$42,000." Id.
109. See Shackelford & Myers, supra note 88, at 347; White Paper,supra note 14.
110. See Shackelford& Myers, supra note 88, at 347,349.
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and the protocol calls for a new block, for which they may receive
smaller monetary awards serving as incentives."'
After a miner verifies the transactions and mines for the proposed
block, the target hash and the proposed "solution" to the computational
puzzle are then published to the network of nodes, at which point the
nodes have to come to a consensus to either accept the hash or return an
error.1 12 A consensus is achieved if fifty-one percent of the network
agrees that the hash is correct."3 It is then that the block is added to
the blockchain.1 14
c. Ethereum's Blockchain
The blockchains of Ethereum and Bitcoin are similar in that
15
However, Ethereum
validation is still necessary to form each block.
has some distinct differences, including the formation of a new block
every twelve seconds, and a vast array of uses.116 Ethereum charges
participants "gas"-that is, Ether-for the amount of computational
power needed to execute the transaction, and uses the Ether to
incentivize miners. 17
Smart contracts on Ethereum are possible due to a turing-complete
language coded into Ethereum's structure."' Turing-completeness is
akin to "a machine that can simulate any other machine" and allows
Ethereum to be able to understand and codify any contract that could
possibly be written on the chain."' The concept of a turing-complete
language was first envisioned by Alan Turing in 1936 when he created a
computer with the ability to solve any computational problem it was
tasked with by emulating the necessary machine through the
rearrangement of its code. 120 A turing-complete machine will, in theory,
try to solve a new computational task until it does so successfullymeaning that the machine will use an infinite amount of memory and

111.

See DE FILIPPI& WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 217 n.40.

112. See id. at 24.
113. See Shackelford & Myers, supranote 88, at 352.
114. See DE FILPPI& WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 24.
115. See White Paper,supra note 14.
116. See Alyssa Hertig, What Is Ether?, COINDESK (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.coindesk.co
m/information/what-is-ether-ethereum-cryptocurrency.

117.
118.
119.
(Dec. 28,
120.

Sci.

See id.
See DEFILIPPI &WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 28.
See Ben Allen, Turing-Completeness:How Ethereum Does What It Does, BITCOIN MAG.
2017), https://thebitcoinmag.com/2017/12/28/turing-completeness-ethereum.
See Allen, supra note 119;Ian Watson, How Alan Turing Invented the Computer Age,

AM.

(Apr.

26,

2012),

https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/how-alan-turing-

invented-the-computer-age.
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power in attempting an infinite number of calculations until it solves the
task. 1 2 ' Ethereum's transaction fees, in coordination with a transaction
limit, prevent the possibility of a transaction consuming excessive
amounts of memory and power.1 22
Ethereum's main principles are simplicity, universality, modularity,
and agility, all without discrimination or censorship. 12 3 As adoption of
Ethereum becomes more wide-spread, the cost of transacting will rise
because there will be increased computational demand. 1 2 4 This creates a
cost problem for Ethereum and blockchains alike.1 25 Ethereum coders
have pondered the idea of switching their consensus mechanism from a
proof-of-work model to one that does not require a network-majority
verification.1 26 Proof-of-stake is another type of consensus mechanism
used to validate transactions.127 Proof-of-stake is not based on how much
computing power a node is willing to contribute, but rather it "enables
parties to validate transactions based on the amount of stake (or virtual
currency) that they hold." 1 28 Ina proof-of-stake model, a party is chosen
at random to validate a proposed block of transactions-the more wealth
a party holds, the more "stake" the party holds, and the more likely it is
that the party will be chosen to validate the data.12 9
d. Forks
Blocks connect to form a blockchain. 13 0 Visualize a vertical
hierarchy model-at the very top is the origin block (Block A-which is
the genesis block of Bitcoin)-each new block is added directly under
the previous block (Block B and Block C). 1 3 In some cases, the
blockchain forks. 1 2 3 A fork is when a new valid block (Block Bl) is
added to the blockchain but does not point to the directly preceding

121.

See White Paper, supranote 14.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
Alyssa Hertig, How Ethereum Mining Works, COINDESK (Nov. 22, 2019),

https://www.coindesk.com/information/ethereum-mining-works.
127. See White Paper,supra note 14.
128. See DE FILIPPI& WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 231 n.90.
129. See Vaughn & Baron, supra note 99, at 3-4.
130. See Bernard Marr, A Complete Beginner's Guide to Blockchain, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/01/24/a-complete-beginners-guide-to-blockchain/#

400dbede6e6O.
131. See White Paper, supra note 14. In reality, it is actually a linear model, but for
understanding how forks work, it is better to think of a blockchain as a vertical model.Id.
132. See DE FILIPPI& WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 24.
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33
block (Block C), thereby splitting the blockchain.1 Forks can form
34
In July 2017, Bitcoin
intentionally, negligently, or maliciously.1
Improvement Proposal
"Bitcoin
activate
to
order
in
forked
intentionally
91," which was then accepted by over eighty percent of the network.135
Curators for a blockchain protocol may develop new code for an existing
blockchain and users who fail to update the software can cause the chain
to fork.1 36
In some instances, malicious actors perform "51% attacks."' A
"51% attack" occurs when a group of nodes conspire to take over fiftyone percent of the computing power of the blockchain network in order
to have the power of consensus, thereby "allowing them to determine
what is recorded to the network's records, and potentially to revise the
existing record."' 3 8 This causes miners to make a decision: Which fork
of the chain is more valid?1 3 9 Generally, the longest fork chain is
considered the accepted chain.140 These attacks, as well as the basic
framework of distributed ledger technology, create a zone of uncertainty
in the legal field.141

133. See Shackelford & Myers, supra note 88, at 347-48.
134. See DE FILPPI& WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 24.
135. See id. at 280 n.46.
136. See id. at 24.
137. See id. at 25.
138. Id. at 25; Angela Walch, The Path of The Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law), 36 REV.
BANKING & FIN.L. 713, 739 (2017) (emphasis added).
139. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 24.
140. See id. at 24. Specifically, when there is a fork in the blockchain:
Two different chains extend from a given transaction block. The network now must
decide which of these forks is legitimate to arrive at shared consensus . . .. In such an

outcome, the miner must choose one chain to follow. Although the community will only
accept the longest chain, because of communication delays and other problems it is
possible for there to be several competing chains that simultaneously are essentially the
same length. Eventually, through random processes, one will become substantially larger
than the other, and the community will coalesce around this chain. All transaction blocks
in the dropped fork are now invalid, and ignored. Any transactions that were only
approved in the deprecated chain are now null and void.. . .When non-technical means
result in a fork, it is uncommon for blockchain forks to vary in length by more than one
block. Thus, participants in a transaction are typically cautioned to ensure that at least
three transaction blocks are confirmed as part of the blockchain after the one including
their transaction of interest. This ensures it is highly likely that their transaction is not
involved in a fork of the blockchain that will eventually be discarded.
Shackelford & Myers, supra note 88, at 348 n.65; see also Vitalik Buterin, Bitcoin Network Shaken
by Blockchain Fork, BITCOIN MAG. (Mar. 13, 2013), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/bitcoinnetwork-shaken-by-blockchain-fork-1363144448.
141. See infra Part If.A.2.b.
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Retrieving Admissible Evidence: An Overview of Electronic Storage
in the FederalRules

This Subpart discusses the changes to Title V of the FRCP, which
contains the specific procedures by which a litigant must abide during
the civil discovery process and the current way in which each rule is
applied in the electronic information context. 1 4 2 Then, this Subpart looks
at the rules and process for admitting electronically stored information
("ESI") into evidence once it has been discovered pursuant to
the FRCP. 43
1. The FRCP and Its Recent Amendments
The FRCP were created in 1938 and set out the specific processes
that must be followed in civil litigation in the federal court system. 144
The goal of the FRCP is to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding" within federal
jurisdiction.1 4 5 Since its conception, the FRCP has undergone ten
significant revisions-the last of which was in 2015.146 With each wave
of amendments, "[t]he reforms have concentrated on ... special rules
pertaining to electronically stored information ... [and] the standard that
defines the overall scope of discoverable information ....
The first mention of the concept of e-discovery was made in a Note
to FRCP 34 by the Advisory Committee in 1970.148 The Note
"indicat[ed] that electronic data compilations were discoverable and
included within the meaning of the term 'documents.'"" 4 9 It was not until
the 2006 amendments that the drafters created a procedure for
discovering ESI, thereby establishing the e-discovery process within the
FRCP. 1 5 As previously mentioned, the drafters revised the discovery
rules in 2015 with the goals of "[l]imiting the scope (and expense) of
large discovery requests[; encouraging a] spirit of cooperation amongst
parties to reach a quick resolution to disputes[; and increasing fllexibilty

142. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. Title V (describing the procedures a litigant must abide by
during the civil discovery process); infra Part II.C.1.

143. See infra Part I.C.2.
144.

See FRCP & E-Discovery: TheLayman's Guide, EXTERRO,https://www.exterro.com/frcp

-e-discovery-guide (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
145. Id. at 6.
146. Id. at 4.
147.

BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., CIvIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 506

(Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 6th ed. 2017).
148. See Josh Blane, Drowning in Data:How the FederalRules Are Staying Afloat in a Flood
ofInformation, 45 RUTGERS L. REc. 65, 68-69 (2017).

149. Id. at 68-69.
150.

FRCP & E-Discovery: The Layman's Guide, supra note 144, at 4.
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around penalties when reasonable steps have been taken and important
1
data can still be produced.""'
The rule subject to many revisions is FRCP 26.152 FRCP 26 focuses
on seven main topics pertaining to discovery: (1) required disclosures
under FRCP 26(a); 1 5 3 (2) the scope of discovery defined by FRCP 26(b);
(3) protective orders under FRCP 26(c); (4) the timing and sequence of
discovery outlined by FRCP 26(d); (5) supplementing disclosures and
responses under FRCP 26(e); (6) conferences between the parties for
planning discovery under FRCP 26(f); and (7) the signature
requirements of FRCP 26(g).15 4
FRCP 26(b) has been at the center of controversy in many cases for
numerous decades.iss FRCP 26(b) originally allowed for litigants to use
the discovery process as a "fishing expedition[]" as it provided for a
liberal interpretation of its scope and no limitations on the parties'
abilities to use the various discovery tools.

156

The 1970s version of

FRCP 26(b) limited the scope of discovery by requiring the information
sought to be "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
case" and "appear[] reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence." 1

7

The drafters then went on to amend FRCP

26(b)(2) in 1983 in an attempt to prevent burdensome discovery
abuses.158 However, neither of these amendments were sufficient in the
eyes of the Advisory Committee. 15 9
After amending FRCP 26(b) in 2000, the Advisory Committee reamended the Rule in 2015, further limiting the discovery process." The
2015 amendments to FRCP 26(b), creating the current version,161 calls
for a proportionality element requiring the court to balance the six
factors in FRCP 26(b)(1) in determining whether a discovery request is
62
outside the scope of the Rule, and thereby not discoverable.
151. Id. at 5.
152.

See infra note 153 and accompanying text.

153.
154.

For purposes of this Note, see FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii), (a)(3)(A)(i)-(iii).
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)-(g). This Note will not be discussing FRCP 26(c)-(g).

155.

BABCOCK ET AL., supra note 147, at 505.

156. See id. at 505-06.
157. FRCP & E-Discovery: The Layman's Guide, supra note 144, at 15 (internal citations
omitted).
158. BABCOCK ET AL., supra note 147, at 526 ("[T]he 1983 revision called for a court to place
limits on the frequency of discovery if it was found 'unreasonably cumulative, more readily
obtainable from another source, redundant of discovery already taken, unduly burdensome or
expensive taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the
parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation."').
159. Id. at 506-07.
160. See id. at 507.
161. For purposes of this Subpart, see FED. R. Civ.P. 26(b)(1), (b)(2)(C)(i)-(iii).
162. FRCP & E-Discovery: The Layman's Guide, supra note 144, at 13.
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Additionally, the Advisory Committee addressed the discovery
problems relating to ESI.1 6 3 Before the 2006 amendments, ESI was
treated similarly to paper documents in terms of discovery.1 6 4 Now,
various different provisions relate specifically to the discovery process
for ESI. 6 5 In regards to FRCP 26(b), subsections (2) and (5) both relate
to ESI, but in different ways.16 6 FRCP 26(b)(2)(B) outlines the
limitations on the extent of production of ESI for parties where the costs
and burdens of production would outweigh any potential benefit derived
from the information sought.1 67
When conducting a cost-benefit analysis in regards to retrieving
ESI and awarding cost-sharing under FRCP 26(c), courts have
considered the responding party's actions in storing information in a
potentially unrecoverable source.1 6 8 For instance, in Quinby v. WestLB
AG, although the court agreed that the production costs outweighed any
benefit, it refused to order the requesting party split in the discovery
costs.1 69 The court reasoned, "if a party creates its own burden or
expense by converting into an inaccessible format data that it should
have reasonably foreseen would be discoverable material at a time when
it ... anticipated litigation, then it should not be entitled to shift the costs
of restoring and searching the data." 7 0 This reasoning was based on
FRCP 37 spoliation:' 7 "[T]he downgrading of data to a less accessible
form-which systematically hinders future discovery by making the
recovery of the information more costly and burdensome-is a violation
of the preservation obligation."7 2
In PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors,Inc.,1 7 3 the court
refused to allocate the cost of the production of 3000 emails where the
production process used by the plaintiff separated emails and
attachments in a way that made it unable to be tethered back.'7 4 The
court noted that "[w]hether created by a software incompatibility or

163.

See supra note 142 and accompanying text.

164.
165.
166.
167.

Blane, supra note 148, at 70.
See supra PartII.1.
See supra PartI.C.1.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2)(B).

168.

See infra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.

169. 245 F.R.D. 94,104 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
170. Id.
171. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); FRCP & E-Discovery: The Layman's Guide, supra note 144, at
23 (outlining the five-part test conducted by federal courts to determine whether sanctions should be
imposed on a party if it is found to have not preserved ESI in accordance of FRCP 37(e)).

172. Quinby, 245 F.R.D. at 103 n.12 (internal citation omitted).
173. No. 1:05-CV-657,2007 WL 2687670 (N.D.N.Y Sept. 7,2007).
174. Seeid.at*4,*12.
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malfunction, such deficiency does not provide a sufficient excuse from
presenting an important aspect of discovery in a convoluted fashion.""'
17 6
Under the FRCP, privileged materials are not discoverable. The
concept stems from various common law principals and include, among
17 7
These
other types, work-product and attorney-client privileges.
by
inadvertently,
and
intentionally
both
waived,
be
can
privileges
178
of
disclosure
inadvertent
the
with
litigants. FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) deals
party
privileged materials.179 Inadvertent disclosure may occur when the
8
voluntarily discloses the confidential information to a third party.
In response to this unwanted possibility, parties may enter into a
"quick peek" or "clawback agreement[]."ist A clawback agreement
allows a party to produce documents without waiving any privileges, so
long as the responding party identifies and requests the return of any
documents mistakenly produced. 1 82 Similarly, a quick peek agreement
allows the parties to informally "peek" at any documents sought for
production without waiving any privileges.1 83 Upon informal review, the
requesting party returns all documents and designates the specific
documents it wishes to have formally produced by the responding
party.1 8 4 The responding party will then formally produce the specified
documents and assert any privileges.185 The designation made by the
81 6
requesting party is also known as the FRCP 34 request. Under these
two agreements, the requesting party cannot claim that the responding
party waived any protections .87 Although these agreements protect
inadvertent disclosure between the parties to the case, they do not apply
to claims of waiver made by third parties.188
The provisions found in FRCP 34 are intended to govern the form
of discoverable ESI.1 89 In a 2006 Note to this rule, the Advisory
Committee intended the word "record" to be read broadly: "Rule
34(a)(1) is expansive and includes any type of information that is stored
175.

Id. at *12.

176.

BABCOCK ETAL., supra note 147, at 529.

177.
178.
179.

See id. at 529-30.
See id. at 550.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(5)(B).

180.

See BABCOCKET AL., supra note 147, at 550.

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See id. at 589.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 34.

187.

See BABCOCK ET AL., supra note 147, at 589.

188.
189.

Id.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
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electronically .... [It] is intended to be broad enough to cover all

current types of computer-based information, and flexible enough to
encompass future changes and developments."" The Committee went
on further to say, "References elsewhere in the rules to 'electronically
stored information' should be understood to invoke this expansive
approach.""' FRCP 34 also includes the term "data compilation" in
reference to the applicable form of a "record" for purposes of discovery,
which means that the term encompasses the storage of "information
other than the conventional words and figures in written or
documentary form."19 2
The drafters of the FRCP have tried to keep up with the rapidly
changing technological landscape evolving every day.1 93 However, the
attempt to achieve inclusivity has resulted in an uptick of civil discovery
litigation. 1 94 The broad scope of discovery prescribed by FRCP 26(b), in
conjunction with that of FRCP 34, will cause litigants to participate in
discovery abuses and infringe upon the privileges the court seeks
to uphold.1 95

2. FRE and Its Recent Amendments
The FRE were adopted in 1975 in order to "administer every
proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the
truth and securing a just determination."' 96 Since its adoption, the FRE
drafters have made numerous amendments in an attempt to conform with
the FRCP and the changing technology surrounding ESI. 19 7
Under the FRE, the main factor that determines whether or not a
particular piece of information, or compilation thereof, is admitted into
evidence at trial is its authenticity. 98 Admissibility hinges on four major
categories of rules: (1) judicial discretion, (2) relevancy, (3) authenticity,
and (4) hearsay.1 99 Under FRE 104(a), a preliminary determination is
190. James Ching, Is Blockchain Evidence Inadmissible Hearsay?, LAW.COM (Jan. 7, 2016),
https://www.law.com/sites/jamesching/2016/01/07/is-blockchain-evidence-inadmissible-hearsay.

191. Id.
192. Id.
193.
194.

See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.

195.
196.
197.
198.
(2017).

See infra Part II.A.
FED. R. EVID. 102.
See infra Part II.C.2.
See Paul W. Grimm et al., Authenticating Digital Evidence, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 3 n.1

199.

See also Paul W. Grimm & Kevin F. Brady, Recent Changes to Federal Rules of

Evidence: Will They Make It Easier to Authenticate ESI?, 19 SEDONA CONF. J. 707, 734 app. A
(2018).
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made by a judge with sole discretion in determining the admissibility of
a piece of evidence and whether it will go to the jury200 FRE 104(a)
states, "[t]he court must decide any preliminary question about
whether ... a privilege exists, or [whether] evidence is admissible. In so
deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on
privilege." 2 0 1 Inorder to persuade the judge into admitting a piece of
evidence, an attorney will have to establish that the evidence is relevant,
20 2
authentic, and not barred by hearsay or the original source rule.
Relevancy concerns whether a particular piece of evidence is
related to an issue in the case.203 FRE 401 sets out the test for relevancy;
ultimately requiring the evidence to make a fact that is of consequence to
204
the litigation more or less probable than it would be otherwise. The
next step is to look at FRE 402 and whether the evidence is excluded by
any relevant law.205 Finally, FRE 403 requires a balancing of party
interests-specifically, the consideration of six factors outweighing the
20 6
probative value of the evidence proffered. If the evidence passes the
FRE 401 test, is not excluded by FRE 402, and the probative value is
sufficiently aligned with party interests, then the evidence is considered
relevant for admissibility purposes.207
The next step is to establish that the evidence seeking to be
admitted is authentic.208 Authenticity addresses whether the evidence is
what it purports to be.209 FRE 901 requires the litigant to establish that
the evidence is what he offers it to be and provides examples in certain
situations.210 In order to do this, the litigant must provide additional
evidence that is admissible. 2 1 1 For the purposes of this Note, the
pertinent examples of FRE 901(b) relate to distinctive characteristics,
2 12
ancient documents, data compilations, and processes or systems.

200. Grimm et al., supra note 198, at 6; see also FED. R. EID. 201 (governing judicial notice
of adjudicative facts).

201.

FED. R. EVID. 104(a).

202.
203.
204.

Grimm et al., supranote 198, at 5-6.
Grimm & Brady, supra note 199, at 713.
See FED. R. EvID. 401; Grimm & Brady, supra note 199, at 736.

205. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
206. See FED. R. EvID. 403. The six factors include: "unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Id.
207. See Grimm & Brady, supra note 199, at 736.

208.
209.
210.
211.

See
See
See
See

id.
Grimm & Brady, supra note 199, at 713.
FED. R. EVID. 901.
United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 495, 495, 501-02 (9th Cir. 2010) (denying

authentication where the only basis for authenticating records was through an inadmissible and
unexcused hearsay statement); Grimm et al., supra note 198, at 3 n.1.

212. See FED. R.EVID. 901(b).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol48/iss2/8

20

Knight: Blockchain Jenga: The Challenges of Blockchain Discovery and Admi

2019]

BLOCKCHAIN JENGA

539

FRE 902 sets forth the characteristics of self-authenticating
evidence. 2 1 3If a litigant offers self-authenticating evidence under FRE
902, then he does not need to establish authentication under FRE 901.214
FRE 902 was recently amended in 2017 to "positively influence how
parties manage [ESI]."215 Self-authenticating evidence is exactly what it
sounds like-evidence that does not have to be authenticated prior to
being admitted. 2 16 For the purposes of this Note, only FRE 902
Subsections (1l)-(14) pertaining to authentication of domestic and
foreign records of a regularly conducted activity, records generated by
an electronic process or system, and data copied from an electronic
device, storage medium, or file, respectively, will be analyzed. 2 1 7
Subsections (11) and (12) are self-authenticating "only to the extent the
party seeking to introduce them into evidence certifies their authenticity
and provides notice to the opposing party."2 1 8
FRE 902(13) and (14) are new additions to the rules as of 2017 and
relate to the admissibility of ESI specifically.219 FRE 902(13) allows for
the authentication of machine-generated information through the
certification prepared by a qualified person. 2 2 0 FRE 902(14) allows
authentication of electronic data through the process of digital
identification. 22 1 This isdone through the comparison of the hash values
of the original document and the proffered evidence. 222
Once the evidence is deemed relevant and authentic by the judge, it
must be determined whether the evidence is "hearsay. 2 2 3 Hearsay is an
out-of-court statement made by a declarant 224 offered for proving the

213. See FED. R. EvrD. 902.
214. See In re Miller, No. 10-25453, 2012 WL 6041639, at *7 (Bankr. D. Colo. Dec. 4, 2012)
("When a self-authenticating document is offered under Rule 902, the proponent is relieved of the
requirement to lay foundation or present testimony through a witness. In other words, if a document
is self-authenticating, the general authentication requirement of Rule 901 is deemed satisfied.")
(internal citations omitted); Grimm & Brady, supra note 199, at 713.

215.
216.
217.

Grimm & Brady, supra note 199, at 707.
See id. at 713.
See FED. R. EVID. 902(11)-(14).

218.

Grimm & Brady, supra note 199, at 714; see FED. R. EVID. 902(11), (12).

219.
220.

Grimm & Brady, supra note 199, at 714-15; see FED. R. EVID. 902(13), (14).
FED. R. EvID. 902(13); Grimm & Brady, supra note 199, at 716-17.

221.

FED. R. EvID. 902(14); Grimm & Brady, supra note 199, at 717.

222.

FED. R. EvD. 902(14); Grimm & Brady, supra note 199, at 717 ("A hash value is a

&

unique alpha-numeric sequence of characters that an algorithm determines based upon the digital
contents of the device . . .. If the hash values for the original and copy are identical, the information
can be proffered, and the court can rely on them as authentic copies.").
223. See Grimm & Brady, supra note 199, at 736.
224. FED. R. EVID. 801(b) ("'Declarant' means the person who made the statement."). The
statement does not have to be written, but it has to be made by a person, not a machine. GRIMM
BRADY, supra note 199, at 737.
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truth of a matter asserted. 2 2 5 If the evidence is considered to be hearsay,
it is inadmissible; however, there are non-hearsay exemptions and
exceptions to the general rule barring hearsay that allow hearsay
evidence to still be admitted.226 For purposes of this Note, the relevant
sections are FRE 802 and FRE 803(6).227 FRE 803(6) is also referred to
22 8
The Rules provide
as the "Business Records exception" to hearsay.
that "evidence can be admissible as a 'business record' if it met several
requirements, including that it 'was kept in the course of a regularly
conducted activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling'
and that 'making the record was a regular practice of that activity.'229 In
applying this Rule, courts heavily weigh the reliability of the evidence,
and whether the process of keeping the business records includes its
systematic checking, regularity, and continuity.230
The FRE both protects and challenges litigants in regards to
admitting records into evidence. 2 3 1 The four-part analysis concerning
authenticity, hearsay, relevancy, and ultimately, judicial discretion,
transition the parties from discovering the records to the process of
proving their admissibility.232 The Rules as they are currently drafted,
however, will be challenged as litigation involving blockchain records
2 33
continues to grow.
Ill.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF BLOCKCHAIN IN THE CIVIL DISCOVERY
AND EVIDENCE PROCESSES

This Part provides a probe into the possible civil discovery and
litigation implications stemming from the implementation of distributed
ledger technology. 2 34 Subpart A discusses the current process of
blockchain discovery, including the challenges litigants will face when
conducting civil discovery according to the existing rules.235 There will
be an examination of the blockchain discovery process through the use

225. FED. R. EVID. 801(a-(c); see Grimm& Brady, supra note 199, at 737.
226. See FED. R.EvID. 801(d), 803-807; Grimm& Brady, supra note 199, at 737.
227. FED. R. EVID. 802 ("Hearsay is not admissible unless any of the following provides
otherwise: a federal statute; these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court."); FED. R.
EvID. 803(6).
228. AngelaGuo, Blockchain Receipts: Patentabilityand Admissibility in Court, 16 CHI.-KENT
J. INTELL. PROP. 440, 448 (2017).
229. Id. at 448 (citing FED. R. EvID. 803(6)).
230. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee's note to proposed rules.
231. See supra Part II.C.2.
232. See supra Part II.C.2.
233. See infra Part III.
234. See infra Part II.A-B.
235. See infra Part HI.A.
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of hypothetical Company X-which utilizes various blockchains in its
day-to-day activities.236 Subpart B then looks to the FRE and analyze
whether blockchain records is an admissible form of evidence not barred
by the hearsay doctrine.237
A.

Discovering the Block

Discovery is a tool used to uncover relevant facts related to a
particular case.238The scope of discoverable material, more specifically,
the term "record," should be interpreted broadly to encompass the blocks
of distributed ledgers. 2 39 This is because blocks are, in their most simple
form, data compilations.240 A data compilation includes "any means of
storing information other than the conventional words and figures in
written or documentary form." 24 1 The drafters intended for FRCP
34(a)(1)(A) to include these compilations under the term "record." 42 2
Given this, blockchains are discoverable ESI under the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 24 3ThisPart will discuss the current discovery procedure for
blockchain records, as well as the possible implications and roadblocks
litigants will have to address given the current state of the FRCP. 2 4
1. General Procedure for Blockchain Discovery
The process for discovering a block or blockchain is substantially
the same as all ESI: identification, preservation, collection, examination,
and analysis.245 Take for example, Company X.246 In the blockchain
context, the type of blockchain and method of data storage that
Company X implements affects the data collection process.247 For
example, if Company X uses Blockchain A, a blockchain used to store
non-encrypted, whole documents (such as a Microsoft Word or Excel
file), it will have to query the blockchain by whatever search terms are
applicable and download the transactions and associated files.248
236. See infra Part II.A..
237. See infra Part III.B.
238. See BABCOCK ET AL., supra note 147, at 499, 505.
239. See infra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
240. See supranote 99 and accompanying text.
241. Ching, supra note 190.
242. Id.
243. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
244. See infra Part HI.A.1-2.
245. MICHAEL DORAN, A FORENSIC LOOK AT BrrCOIN CRYPTOCURRENCY 4 (2015).
246. See infra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
247. See infra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
248. See Lukas Marx, Storing Data on the Blockchain: The Developers Guide, MALCODED
(July 5, 2018), https://malcoded.com/posts/storing-data-blockchain. For the purposes of
hypothetical Blockchain A and B, assume that the protocols of Blockchain A and B permit the user
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However, if Company X uses Blockchain B, which stores actual
documents that are encrypted and spliced,2 4 9 then it would have to access
the hash table via the document's private key in order to un-shard the
file (that is, put it back together), at which point it would be able to
unencrypt the document, query the data, and produce the record. 2 50 The
process of data collection from smart contracts is similar to that of
Blockchain A and B, and is as follows:
In the public blockchain space, the first step would be to identify all
smart contracts' addresses in order to capture the payload containing
the logic for the contract. The next step would be to find all
transactions on the blockchain executed against these smart contracts.
Finally, any application code that was written to interact with the smart
contracts [is] located in the blockchain. All of this information [needs]
to be deciphered and presented in a way that would make sense ....
For any private blockchain, the process may be the same as well as the
entire blockchain may be potentially responsive. 25 1

It is important to note that one cannot just simply search a
blockchain for a specific document. 2 52 Traditional quarriable data inputs
include a block number, address, a block hash, a transaction hash, or a
public key.253 Additionally, it is a common misconception that all
blockchains actually store documents and records.254 Instead, most
blockchains are comprised of hashes of Merkle trees 2 55 consisting of
hashes of records stored elsewhere (for example, in the cloud).256

to store information directly on the blockchain and query for data. See Ben Whittle, Storing
Documents on the Blockchain: Why, How, and Where, COINCENTRAL (Dec. 28, 2018),
For example,
https://coincentral.com/storing-documents-on-the-blockchain-why-how-and-where.
Bitcoin does not enable a user to store an actual document on the chain; it instead requires the user
to compress and put the information into a hexadecimal format. Id.

249. See Marx, supra note 248; Whittle, supra note 248. For the Blockchain B hypothetical,
the document is in duplicative encrypted shards (that is, pieces) stored throughout the system of
nodes and a cryptographic hash table is used in conjunction with the associated private key (for the
document, not for the user). See Marx, supra note 248; Whittle, supra note 248.
250. See Shreyas Nanaware, Blockchain for Data Storage, MEDIUM (June 3, 2018),
https://medium.com/@sukantkhurana/blockchain-for-data-storage-8c5cOOaf6fe.
251. Aaron Vick, The Emergence of Blockchain and Its Impact on E-discovery, LEGALTECH
15,
2018),
https://wwwlaw.com/egaltechnews/2018/05/15/the-emergence-ofNEWS
(May

blockchain-and-its-impact-on-e-discovery.
252.

See also DORAN, supra note 245, at 9-10.

253. Id. at 9.
254. LEMIEUX,supra note 61,at25 n.25.
255. Curran, supra note 102. Merkle trees are "data structure[s] that can take 'n' number of

hashes and represent it with a single hash." Id. See LEMIEUX, supra note 61, at 25 n.25.
256.

LEMIEUX,supra note 61,atn.25.
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As previously mentioned, blockchains are discoverable ESI under
the FRCP, as a block is a compilation of data. 25 7 Given this, FRCP 34
requests and productions allow the possibility of discovery abuse by the
litigants. 2 5 8For example, FRCP 34 allows a party to file a request to gain
access to the other party's data compilations within the discovery
scope. 2 5 9This may not seem problematic on its face; however, the
requesting party may seek data from the blockchain accessible only
through private key access, which could be done by submitting an FRCP
34 request seeking access to an adversary's wallet. 26 Gaining access to a
person's private keys will enable the party to not only control the user's
wallet, but it will also give that party access to every single transaction
associated with that private key-some of which may be outside the
scope of discovery or privilege. 2 6 1 This concept of private key access
also affects nonparties in a suit through the application of FRCP 45.262
The implications of key access and otherwise broad discovery
requests in blockchain litigation was at issue in United States v.
Coinbase, Inc.2 63 In that case, the IRS used a Summons to request the
production of the following user information:
[(1)]
[a]ccount/wallet/vault
registration records
for each
account/wallet/vault owned or controlled by the user during the period
stated above limited to name, address, tax identification number, date
of birth, account opening records, copies of passport or driver's
license, all wallet addresses, and all public keys for all
accounts/wallets/vaults[; (2)] [rJecords of Know-Your-Customer
diligence[; (3)] [a]greements or instructions granting a third-party
access, control, or transaction approval authority [; (4)] [a]ll records of
account/wallet/vault activity including transaction logs or other records
identifying the date, amount, and type of transaction
(purchase/sale/exchange), the post transaction balance, the names or
other identifiers of counterparties to the transaction; requests or

257.

See supra note 243 and accompanying text.

258. FED. R. CIv. P. 34; FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee's notes to 2006 and 2015
amendments.
259. FED. R. CIV. P. 34; FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory comnittee's notes to 2006 and 2015
amendments.
260. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 34; FED. R. CIv. P. 34 advisory committee's notes to 2006 and
2015 amendments.
261. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
262. FED. R. CIV. P. 34, 45. FRCP 45 provides the ability to subpoena nonparties under a
FRCP 34 request. Id. A nonparty could be any participant in the blockchain. See supra Part II3.2.
This would expose every owner of the chain to liability for transactions or data they may not have
had direct influence on. See infra Partm.A.2.b.
263. Order Re Petition to Enforce IRS Summons, at *1, *2, United States v. Coinbase, Inc.,
No.17-c-01431-JSC, 2017 WL 5890052 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28,2017).
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instructions to send or receive bitcoin; and, where counterparties
transact through their own Coinbase accounts/wallets/vaults, all
available information identifying the users of such accounts and their
contact information[; (5)] [c]orrespondence between Coinbase and the
user or any third party with access to the account/wallet/vault
pertaining to the account/wallet/vault opening, closing, or transaction
activity[; and (6)] [a]ll periodic statements of account or invoices (or
the equivalent).264
Upon objection by the defendant, the IRS argued that the
information of over 10,000 account holders was necessary in order to
verify the identity and transaction sequences of the user.2 6 5 The court
rejected the government's argument in that the request was broader than
necessary and limited the production to those documents that are
relevant to the government's claim. 26 6 Although the ruling was based on
the use of a John Doe Summons, the reasoning behind the holding can
be said to apply to FRCP 26(b) in that both have elements of relevancy
and necessity that must be met. 26 7
2. Discovery Roadblocks
a. "What's [M]y [N]ame?"

68

In all civil litigation, plaintiffs are required to name the
defendant(s) in a complaint; however, this seemingly easy task becomes
daunting when dealing with a public blockchain. 2 69 Due to the fact that
there exists four parties in a blockchain-(1) end-users (transactors), (2)
miners, (3) nodes, and (4) owners or developers 27 0 -there becomes a
question of which party should be named. 2 7 1 This is because the cause of
action may arise from a code error, and therefore, the responsible party
may be more difficult to pinpoint and subsequently, to meet the burden
of proof against. 2 72 If a plaintiff begins an action against every single

264.
265.
266.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *6-*7.

267.

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Order Re Petition to Enforce IRS Summons, supra note 263, at

*3, *7.
RrHANNA (Fr.DRAKE), What's My Name, on LOUD (StarGate 2010).
269. See infra Part II.A.2. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10.
270. See supra Part IIB.2.
271. See infra Part I.A.2.
272. Emma Stevens, Blockchain and Smart Contracts - Dispute Resolution Challenges,
COMPUTING (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/opinion/3063827/blockchain-andsmart-contracts-dispute-resolution-challenges.
268.
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node in the network, the amount of discoverable information that he
could request is obscene.2 73
The next issue associated with this problem is to actually name
someone, that is, put a name to either a person(s) holding a specific title
within the system or a public key.274 In regards to the former, owners and
developers of a blockchain may choose to remain anonymous: "Even
where someone is responsible for a blockchain, the responsible
individuals often avoid making themselves available to be sued."2 7 5 For
instance, if Bitcoin was involved in a lawsuit, and the plaintiff wanted to
hold the initial developer accountable (not the current owner), he would
be unable to do so because the true identity of Satoshi Nakamoto is
unknown, as the name is merely a pseudonym. 2 7 6 In regards to the latter,
a plaintiff will have to determine who the person behind the key is in
order to name him in the suit, a daunting task considering that in public
blockchains, unless the user gives away his private key or identity, he
will remain completely anonymous. 2 7 7 Additionally, in most public
blockchains, there is no centralized account manager that is responsible
for verifying and correlating a user's physical identity to their keys.278
The lack of evidence concerning the identity or other relevant
information of a defendant deprives the plaintiff of his ability to engage
279
in the civil discovery process in order to meet his burden of proof.
b. "That's a [L]iability" 280
In the civil discovery context, there are two overarching categories
that are impacted by distributed ledger technology: the users that exist
on the blockchain and the data itself.28 1 As discussed in Part .B, a

273. See supra Parts H.B, HI.A.I.
274. See infra Part III.A.2.
275. Noah Webster & Aaron Charfoos, How the DistributedPublic Ledger Affects Blockchain
Litigation, 37 No. 1 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL'Y REP. 6, 8 (2018) (emphasis added).
276. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.

277. See Adam Brill, Blockchain Will Bring Opportunities, Challenges to Legal Discovery,
LJ.NEWSLETTERS (Sept. 1, 2018), http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/2018/09/01/blockchai
n-will-bring-opportunities-challenges-to-legal-discovery.

278.

Shackelford & Myers, supra note 88, at 350.

279.

See, e.g., Order Granting Temporary Restraining

Order at 3, Paige v. Bitconnect

International PLC, et al., No. 3:18-cv-00058-JHM, 2018 WL 2085214 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 30, 2018)
[hereinafter Order Granting Temporary Restraining Order]; Motion For Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction at 27, Greene v. Mt. Gox, Inc., et al., No. 1:14-cv-01437 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 4, 2014) (granted Temporary Restraining Order, Greene v. Mt. Gox, Inc., et al., No. 1:14-cv-

01437 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2014)) [hereinafter Motion For Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction].
280. FUTURE, Mask Off, on FUTURE (Metro Boomin 2017).

281.

See infra PartIIIA.2.
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blockchain has two distinct features that will inevitably expose users to
unlimited liability: consensus and immutability. 2 8 2Due to the fact that
every node (not transactor) participating in the blockchain has a copy of
the chain, and in a proof-of-work state, comes to an agreement regarding
the way that the information stored (whether it be documents or
transactions), there is a possibility that a node could be involved in a suit
for possessing information on the blockchain that is uncovered during
discovery. 28 3 For example, a blockchain may expose all node owners to
civil liability if data pertaining to illegal activities (for example, child
pornography) is stored on the blockchain because the node "owns" a
copy of the blockchain, as it is stored on the individual's computer;
therefore, the person behind the node is in possession of (and maybe
distribution of) child pornography. 2 84 The personal data from these
"owners" could be disclosed in a proceeding that they take no part in, as
was experienced by any person that transacted with the defendants in
285
Paige v. Bitconnect InternationalPLC.
The consensus mechanism of a blockchain may also result in the
unintentional waiver of privileges. 28 6 This is due to the fact that a waiver
can occur when a party discloses privileged information to a third
party-knowingly or not.2 8 7 Therefore, the question arises as to whether
a litigant waives a privilege by recording privileged information on a
public blockchain. 2 8 A court could find either way-it all depends on
whether the judge interprets disclosure to include the storing of the
information on an expansive network of machines that have access to
such information. 28 9
The immutability of blockchain data, although fundamental to the
system, has the potential to expose a user to unlimited liability; "once
2
data is logged on a blockchain/DLT, it will be there forever." 9 This
could implicate a number of things, including liability stemming from
human error when inputting data, and a nearly unlimited scope of
discovery regarding time limitations.291 FRCP 37(e) states that a
282. See supra Part I.B.
283. See supra notes 91-92, 112 and accompanying text; supra Part m.A.2.a; infra Part
III.A.2.b.
284. Gabison, supra note 5, at 339.
285. See Order Granting Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 279, at 3.
286. See infra Part I.A.2.b.
287. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
290. Daniel S. Maland, A Prediction on What Blockchain May Mean for Litigators, DALY
BUS. REv. (Oct. 1, 2018, 11:15 AM), https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2018/10/01/aprediction-on-what-blockchain-may-mean-for-litigators.
291. See Stevens, supra note 272; E-discovery and the Blockchain, THE PARROTHEAD
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document kept longer than the prescribed retention period is still within
the scope of discovery and must be produced.2 9 2 In litigation, a party
may use FRCP 37(e) to prove that a particular document sought is no
longer in existence due to the fact that "if you keep [these documents],
you can be hung by them." 29 3 However, this protection is not available to
parties using an active blockchain. 294
Since the blockchain is seemingly forever, litigants may be forced
to produce blockchain records well beyond the retention period required
by law or policy.295 This means that not only will a litigant have to
account for the cost of retrieving the data that otherwise would not be
available in a centralized database, it also means that the actual
information contained in the blockchain may help the requesting party
establish a pattern of conduct or otherwise help prove his
or her case; "[i]f you have it, you are required to produce it even if
you keep it longer." 2 9 6 It is important to note, that the holding in
Pippins v. KPMG was inadvertently adopted by the drafters when
combining the proportionality requirement of FRCP 26(b)(1) with FRCP
37(e) spoliation.297
Another way that a blockchain record may implicate spoliation is
when the chain forks.298 In practice, when a blockchain forks, the longer
fork is accepted by the consensus, and the shorter fork is deemed invalid
and abandoned by the network. 29 9 In theory, this means that the specific
records stored on the shorter fork will also be abandoned, which would
result in the records no longer being preserved and the existence of the
records unable to be proven.300 If this occurs before the retention period
expires, a party may face sanctions for failure to preserve the records.301
In many cases, the parties can disagree over the burden of
producing the requested record-whether it be an objection to the cost of

PROJECT: THOUGHTS AND RAMBLINGS OF A PARROTHEAD (July 21, 2018, 7:33 AM),
https://theparrotheadproject.com/2018/07/21/e-discovery-and-the-blockchain.
292. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment to subsection (f).
293. E-discovery and the Blockchain, supra note 291; Vick, supranote 251.

294. See Vick, supranote 251.
295. E-discovery and the Blockchain, supra note 291.
296. Id.
297. 279 F.R.D. 245, 255 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2012) ("[P]roportionality is necessarily a factor in
determining a party's preservation obligations."); Robert D. Brownstone, ESI & eDiscovery FRCP
Changes, FENWICK & WEST LLP (Nov. 29, 2015), https://www.fenwick.com/publications/pages/esi
-and-ediscovery-frcp-changes.aspx.
298. See infra notes 300-01 and accompanying text.
299. See supra Part H.B.2.d.
300.

LEMIEUX, supra note 61, at 15.

301. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
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production or the inaccessibility of the records302 As previously
mentioned, the process and procedure for producing blockchain records
vary from blockchain to blockchain-all depending on the underlying
protocol.303 Due to the fact that most blockchains consist of hashed
Merkle trees, a party obtaining discovery cannot simply query the
blockchain for complex information (that is, information other than
quarriable data).304 In order to resolve this, litigants often retain
third-party vendors to compile the information sought, thereby raising
3 05
the costs and burdens of discovery for the producing party. However,
the records produced may not be able to be recovered in a readable
format, which triggers spoliation because the litigant failed to store its
data in a manner that does not downgrade the data into a less accessible
format. 30 6 These spoliation concepts are similar to the court's denial of
307
cost sharing in PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc.,
3 08
and Quinby v. WestLB AG.
With public blockchains, there is a limited need for discovery as the
information stored can be easily viewed and accessed by a party in need
309
This can be done through
of the information for his cause of action.
querying a public blockchain for relevant information via an applicable
website. 10 The query can be conducted independently from the
discovery process, or quarriable terms can be disclosed to the requesting
party through required disclosures or upon court order limiting the scope
of discovery.311 Similarly, with regards to agreements between two
parties that have material information recorded on the blockchain, one
party may be able to show that the other party failed to uphold his end of
the bargain simply by looking at the blockchain itself, as was the case in
12
Bitvestment Partners LLC v. Coinlab, Inc.3 However, this ability to

302. See supra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
303. See supra PartII.A.1.
304. See supra notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
305.

LEMIEUX, supra note 61, at 25 n.25.

306. See supra notes 168-75 and accompanying text; supra Part III A.1.
307. No. 1:05-CV-657, 2007 WL 2687670, at *12 (N.D.N.Y Sept. 7, 2007) ("Whether created
by a software incompatibility or malfunction, such deficiency does not provide a sufficient excuse
from presenting an important aspect of discovery in a convoluted fashion.").
308. 245 F.R.D. 94,103-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
309. Webster & Charfoos, supra note 275, at 11.
310. DORAN, supra note 245, at 9.
311. See supra Parts I.C.1, III.A.1.
312. Webster & Charfoos, supra note 275, at 12; see Complaint at 2, Bitvestment Partners LLC
v. Coinlab, Inc., No. 9:16-CV-633-7632 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2013) (asserting that the defendant
breached its agreement to provide Bitvestment Partners LLC with all mined Bitcoin after dedicating
100% of its mining output to producing Bitcoin based on the subsequent mining of approximately
923 Bitcoins recorded on the public blockchain).
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access information without the need for discovery takes for granted that
the blockchain is still accessible. 3 13
One of the most notable cases involving blockchain dealt with the
Bitcoin exchange Mt. Gox, in which the class of claimants asserted that
the exchange lost "hundreds of millions of dollars" of their users' money
when they took their blockchain offline entirely due to a "security
'bug."' 31 4 Due to the fact that Mt. Gox took the blockchain offline, the
claimants could not determine the loss each had sustained from the bug,
and petitioned the court for additional discovery in order to determine
"basic information about their potential claims against the
exchange ... ."15 The court ordered expedited discovery on all
information that the plaintiffs may have needed to prove their case; and,
in a separate protective order, created guidelines for the production of
sensitive personal information, as well as stipulated that the parties may
enter into privilege agreements, but the waiver of privilege was still
available otherwise. 3 16
B.

Litigatingthe Block

Despite the countless benefits and applications of blockchain
technology, its decentralization, anonymity, and immutability have many
legal implications in regards to the admissibility of blockchain-based
evidence. 317 This Subpart begins by determining whether information
stored on the blockchain is authentic under FRE 901 and 902, thereafter
touching upon judicial discretion for evidence admissibility under FRE
201.318 Next, this Subpart considers if blockchain is inadmissible hearsay
under FRE 801 and 803.319 Specifically, the Subpart discusses the
hearsay analysis of the individual blocks, as well as the business records
exception. 320 Note that there will not be a discussion about relevancy
under FRE 401, 402, and 403, due to the fact that the analysis is factdependent; therefore, assume that the blockchain records are relevant to
any hypothetical proceedings321
313. See Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, supra note 279,
at 1, 26-27; Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 279, at 5.
314. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, supra note 279, at 1.

315. Id. at 26-27.
316.

Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 279 at 6; Stipulated Protective Order, at 1-4,

Greene v. Mt. Gox, Inc., et al., No. 1:14-cv-01437 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2016).
317.

See infra Part II.B; see also ELLIS ET AL., supra note 17, at 11; Gabison, supra note 5, at

333, 339; Shackelford & Myers, supra note 88, at 381.
318. SeeinfraPartlI.B.1.
319. See infra Part1II.B.2.
320. See infra Part HI.B.2.a-b.
321.

See infra Part III.B; supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
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1. Data Accuracy and Authentication Under FRE 901 and 902
Accuracy of information "points to the degree of precision and
exactness of data in a record."3 2 2 FRE 901 outlines the requirements of
accurate authentic evidence. 323 Within this Rule, are two subsets of
accurate data relating to blockchain: FRE 901(b)(4)-distinctive
characteristics, and 901(b)(9)-evidence about a system or process.324
FRE 901(b)(4) looks at "[t]he appearance, contents, substance, internal
patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item . . ." while FRE
901(b)(9) establishes information accuracy by looking at the evidence
that describes the process or system and proof that it produces an
accurate result.3 25 Judicial notice of FRE 201 and proof of
self-authentication under FRE 902 use the same facts for FRE 901.326
It is clear that when applying authentication standards to blockchain
data, judges are faced with a substantial task in making evidentiary
rulings.3 2 7 For instance, one may argue that the digital signatures
associated with blockchain transactions establish accuracy under FRE
901(b)(9) in that every transactor and transaction have unique identifiers,
8
32
However,
and therefore the evidence is what it is purported to be.
"[t]here is no central authority where verification keys are vetted or
correlated with physical identities."329
Additionally, one may also argue that the hashes included in the
blockchain establish accuracy of the information for the purposes of
FRE 901 and 902(14)-via a digital identification process of comparing
hash values-because any change to the underlying data would result in
an entirely new hash. 33 0 This argument would only be ripe for review if
the litigant stored the hashed record separately in its original form,
"unchanged and inviolate." 3 3 1 If the document was stored separately, but
altered even in the slightest way, the litigant faces the risk of getting an
entirely different hash by rehashing the record in an attempt to
prove accuracy.332

322.

LEMIEUX, supra note 61, at 16.

323.
324.
325.

FED. R. EVID. 901.
Id. at 901(b)(4), (9).
Id.

326.

See FED. R. EvID. 902(13) advisory committee's note to 2017 amendment; Ching, supra

note 190.
327. See infra Part II.B1.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

See FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(9); supra Part I.B.
Shackelford & Myers, supra note 88, at 350.
See FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(9), 902(14); supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
LEMIEUX, supra note 61, at 15.
Id.
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Under FRE 902(13), machine-generated records certified by an
expert are considered to be self-authenticating. 333 Authenticity is "the
quality of a record that it is what it purports to be in all respects . .. and
that it is free from tampering or corruption." 33 4 In relation to the contents
of a block itself, that is, the list of hash values, timestamps, new
transactions, and a nonce, 3 35 a litigator may try to argue that these values
directly result from the consensus mechanism. 3 3 In doing so, he is
attempting to prove that the fifty-one percent network power consensus
required to write a new block to the chain is solely the result of the
machine, and thereby self-authenticating.33 7
When determining if a process or system produces accurate results,
a party may turn to the underlying software code to establish internal
patterns and the like.33 8 However, software is not immune from
fallibility: "It is widely acknowledged that there is no such thing as
flawless software; there are always errors or 'bugs' that negatively affect
the performance of the software or make it vulnerable to attacks by
hackers." 3 3 9In terms of blockchain technology, the June 2016 DAO
smart contract hack exposed a vulnerability in the "poorly written code"
that allowed the hacker to steal about $50 million worth of Ether.3 This
was just one of the many hacks exploiting blockchain code.3 4 1
In spite of these negative possibilities, a litigant will have to offer
admissible proof of the accuracy of blockchain data in order to
establish the records accuracy342 This can be done by hiring an
expert,such as "an avid Bitcoin user, a programmer attempting to
replicate the blockchain, a digital currency expert, or an investor ... to
explain the process, accuracy, and the exceptional reliability of
blockchain receipts.

333. FED. R. EVID. 902(13).
334.
335.

LEMEUX, supra note 61, at 16.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.

336. See supra Part II.B.2.a-b.
337. Guo, supra note 228, at 446-47.
338.
339.

See infra Part I.B.1; see also LEMIEUX, supra note 61, at 16.
Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A

ConsiderationofOperationalRisk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.POL'Y 837, 856 (2015).
340. E-discovery and the Blockchain,supranote 291.
341. Yogita Khatri, Nearly $1 Billion Stolen in Crypto Hacks So Far This Year: Research,
COINDESK (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/nearly-1-billion-stolen-in-crypto-hacks-sofar-this-year-research (citing research indicating that blockchain hacks will result in the loss of over

$1 billion worth of tokens by the end of 2018).
342. FED. R. EviD. 902(13).
343. Guo, supra note 228, at 447-48.
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It is important to keep in mind, however, that a blockchain is an
3
immutable ledger that does not account for human error. 44 In other
words, blockchains do not take into account the incorrect input of data
3 45
A
resulting from a mistake made by the human writing the record.
put
"data
the
that
establish
to
requirement
the
is
901
FRE
of
pivotal part
into the machine . .. is accurate." 3 46 In terms of data storage and
retrieval, "reliability is the trustworthiness of a record as a statement of
fact and exists when a record can stand for the fact that it is about, based
on the competence of its author, the record's completeness, and the
controls exercised on the process of its creation."3 Putting these
together, a judge may find that although the system can produce accurate
results, there is no guarantee that the information entered into the system
is the same.3 4 8
2. Hearsay
Evidence that is deemed to be authentic will be entered into
evidence, so long as it does not constitute hearsay.349 As mentioned
previously, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of
the matter asserted.3 0 The most notable question surrounding the
admissibility of blockchain evidence is if the record constitutes
admissible hearsay. 35 This involves a two-part analysis of whether
blockchain data is hearsay, and if so, does it fall under the business
records exception to hearsay.3 5 2 This Sub-subpart evaluates hearsay in
terms of the transaction record of the block produced by the protocol,
3 53
that is, hash values, timestamps, nonces, and smart contract code. This
Sub-subpart also addresses the business records exception in relation to
354
both kinds of blockchain data: the blocks and the documents.
a. Hearsay Evaluation of the Blocks Themselves
In regard to blocks, courts have to determine if the proffered
blockchain evidence constitutes an assertion for hearsay purposes. The
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
Ching, supra note 190.
LEMIEUX, supra note 61, at 16.
See also id.
See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text.
See FED.R. EvID. 801; GRIMM & BRADY, supra note 199, at 737.
Guo, supra note 228, at 444.
See infra Part I.B.2.a-b.
See infra Part
See infra Part II.B.2.b.
FED. R. EviD. 801(c); Guo, supra note 228, at 444-45.

El.B.2.a.
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Ninth Circuit has addressed a similar issue in United States v. LizarragaTirado.356 In that case, federal prosecutors presented a Google Earth
image with a computer-generated "tack" to prove that the defendant was
on United States soil at the time of his detainment, and therefore in
violation of federal immigration law.3" The defense objected on hearsay
grounds to both the screenshot of the Google Earth image and the
computer-generated tack. 3 5 In his ruling on the former, the judge
determined that the image was akin to that of a photograph in that it does
not make an assertion, but rather is "a factual depiction of a particular
scene at a particular time," and therefore is not hearsay.3 59
Applying this reasoning to blockchain evidence, a court may view
information stored in each block like a Google Earth image-"a factual
depiction of a particular scene at a particular time"-based on the
timestamp included in each transaction. 36 0 However, the information
stored on a blockchain requires more human intervention than a satellite
image of the earth, "[a]s a blockchain receipt is more like a [man-made]
contention [rather] than like a map, there is a potential hearsay barrier to
the introduction of any result from a distributed ledger, permissionless or
not and proprietary or not." 36 1 Given the fact that records of blockchain
transactions result from human activity of, at the very least, initializing
the transaction, one can opine that there is a greater amount of human
impact over the machine-made blockchain record compared with the
level of influence over a digital photograph. 362
In ruling on whether the thumbtack is inadmissible hearsay, the
Ninth Circuit determined that because the tack was generated
automatically by the computer program and was easily replicable by
conducting the same search, the tack was not hearsay because the
relevant assertion was not made by a person, but rather it was made by a
computer program. 3 6 3 In ruling on this matter, the court looked to the
holdings in various circuits and joined in concluding that statements
made by machines cannot be considered hearsay: "Inadmissible hearsay
356.

789 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2015).

357. Id. at 1108. A "tack," like the one in this case, is "generated via Google [Earth's] 'search'
functions, which pinpoint specific addresses and coordinates when directed to do so by the
program's user." Guo, supra note 228, at 445 n.23.

358. Lizarraga-Tirado,789 F.3d at 1108-09.
359. Id. at 1109; Guo, supra note 228, at 445.
360.

Guo, supra note 228, at 447.

361. Id. at 446-47; Ching, supra note 190.
362. Guo, supra note 228, at 446-47.
363. Lizarraga-Tirado,789 F.3d at 1109-10 (taking judicial notice under FRE 201(b) that the
tack was computer generated and noting "we can access Google Earth and type in the GPS
coordinates, and have done so, which results in an identical tack to the on shown on the satellite
image admitted at trial"); Guo, supra note 228, at 446.
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could only apply to out-of-court statements made by a person; an
'assertion' placed without any human
electronically-generated
364
intervention could not fall under that category."
With regard to a blockchain, courts may consider blockchain
evidence to be solely computer-generated and not an assertion for the
purposes of hearsay. 3 65 In spite of the fact that people interact with the
protocol in order to engage in a transaction, the actual record of the
transaction, that is, the information contained in the block, is computergenerated. 3 66 Similar to obtaining the same data after conducting the
same Google Earth search on two different computers, blockchain data
is also replicated throughout the network of nodes, which verify the
correct version of a record via the consensus mechanism-not human
action-further solidifying the likelihood that a court overrules
objections to blockchain evidence based on hearsay.367
b. Business Records Exception
Under the business records exception provided by FRE 803(6),
evidence that otherwise would be inadmissible hearsay may be allowed
36 8
When
into evidence due to the business nature of the record.
determining whether the exception applies, the courts look at five factors
to determine admissibility; namely, whether: (1) the record was made
by, or from information transmitted by, someone with knowledge; (2)
the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity; (3) making the record was a regular practice of that activity; (4)
the source or preparation of the information suggests a lack of
trustworthiness and should be excluded; and (5) a qualified witness or
custodian can testify to the previous factors369
Regarding the first factor, there is a split of authority between the
courts and the drafters of the role of observers to the recording of data in
relation to information accuracy.370 The courts have tried to assert that
participation in the data recording process leads to a higher level of
accuracy, while the drafters have explicitly rejected this notion to
37
include matters merely observed. 1 Therefore, any data attributed to any
given node on the blockchain will satisfy this factor, as it has access to
364.
365.
366.

Lizarraga-Tirado,789 F.3d at 1110; Guo, supra note 228, at 446.
Guo, supra note 228, at 446-47.
Id. at 447; see supra Part 1.B.2.

367.

Guo, supra note 228, at 447; see supra Part II.B.2.

368.
369.

FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
Id.; see Ching, supra note 190.

370.

FED. R. EvID. 803(6) advisory committee's note to proposed rules.

371.

Id.
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and knowledge of the information via the consensus mechanism and the
process for writing a new block to the chain creates a record within the
proscribed time frame.372
An analysis of the second and third factors are based heavily on the
underlying software code and end-user function, as the factors concern
how the record is kept and the creation of the data on the record.3 7 3 This
is due to the fact that each blockchain is unique in its applications, that
there is no code standardization across the industry, and that it is nearly
impossible to determine, without a set of case-specific facts, whether the
blockchain is being used in the normal course of business.374 Therefore,
in the process of resolving these two factors, the court will turn to the
fourth and fifth factors to determine the fate of the proffered evidence.3 7 5
A litigant seeking to prove the trustworthiness of the record for hearsay
purposes would follow the same process and produce the same
information that was used to authenticate the evidence under FRE 201,
901, and 902.376 Furthermore, the consensus mechanism of the
blockchain may prove the reliability of the information proffered due to
the systematic checking of data.7
IV.

1

PLAYING JENGA: THE FIX

Many proponents of this new and emerging distributed ledger

technology are concerned about the possible stifling of innovation that
may result from any government regulation. 37 8However, due to the rapid
adoption of blockchain technology across numerous sectors of business,
the law must change in order to adapt to this evolving technoscape. 73 9
The best way to achieve a solid regulatory landscape without inhibiting
372.

See supra Part I.B.

373. FED.R.EVID.803(6).
374. FED. R. EvID. 803(6) advisory committee's note to proposed rules ("The formulation of
specific terms which would assure satisfactory results in all cases is not possible."); see supra Parts

H.A.2 & B.2.
375. FED. R. EvID. 803(6) advisory committee's note to proposed rules ("Consequently the rule
proceeds from the base that records made in the course of a regularly conducted activity will be

taken as admissible but subject to authority to exclude if 'the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness."').
376. See FED. R. EVID. 902(13) advisory committee's note to 2017 amendment; Ching, supra
note 190. For an in-depth analysis of data trustworthiness, see supra Part I.B.1.
377. FED. R. EvID. 803(6) advisory committee's note to proposed rules; Ching, supra note 190
("[T]he key factual issue in accepting blockchain receipts . . . is the reliability of the algorithm
underlying it."); see supra Part II.B.2.b.
378. COMPTIA ADVOCACY, supra note 57, at 23-24.
379. Gov'T OFFICE FOR Sci., supra note 45, at 12; see, e.g., BANA & VIERTMANN, supra note
1, at 6-14 (discussing various uses for blockchain technology in the legal profession); ELLIS ET AL.,
supra note 17, at 4-5 (listing the applications of smart contracts); GOv'T OFFICE FOR SCI., supra
note 45, at 24 (listing the various sectors in which blockchain could help combat fraud).
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the development of distributed ledger technology, while mitigating the
problems related to civil litigation, is for legislators, in coordination with
the judiciary, to consider the use of both legal and technical code when
attempting to govern blockchain. 38 0
Since this is a two-part solution, Subpart A focuses on the legal side
of the solution by laying out the necessary amendments to the federal
rules that will mitigate the impact of blockchain technology on civil
litigation and suggesting possible ways to govern the use of distributed
38 1
Subpart B ponders the
ledger technology in the private sector.
implementation of a judicial blockchain to facilitate the
exchange of discoverable material and provide an additional level
of authentication382
A.

Amending the FederalRules and Enacting Legislation

With the emergence of blockchain technology, legislators are faced
with the challenge of regulating blockchain technology without
legislating away its ability to grow and flourish, while courts are trying
to apply outdated rules to an intricate problem without infringing on any
person's rights.383 The solution to these problems involves the
application of legal code-"a classical set of rules provided by the
legislative framework"-and a technical code-"[a] set of rules that
3 84
determine the operation of the algorithms encoded by the software."
two
to
solutions
possible legal
discusses
Subpart
This
how
(2)
and
discoverable;
is
data
what
(1)
overarching problems:
it's authenticated. 385
1. The Scope of Discoverable Data
As previously discussed in Part U.A, the current rules, when
3 86
In order to
applied in blockchain litigation, achieve unfair results.
prevent further injustice, various additions should be made to the FRCP,
in conjunction with federal law.3 8 In regards to initial disclosures under
FRCP 26(a), a subsection should be created to include:
(F) Disclosure of Distributed Ledger Technology Based Information.

Under Rule 26(a)(1)(A), a party does not have to disclose the
380.

Gov'T OFFICE FOR SCL, supra note 45, at 12; see supra Part

381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
Gov'T OFFICE FOR SCI., supra note 45, at 11.
Id.
See infra Part IV.A.1-2.
See supra Part I.A.
See infra Part IV.A.1.
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information of every person or account with access to the distributed
ledger, only those persons with additional discoverable information
other than what is contained on the party's copy of the distributed
ledger. The party need only to disclose the public key associated with
the account. Additionally, a party must include those nonprivileged
quarriable data entries it reasonably believes may lead to the location
of discoverable information, or those entries it intends to use in support
of its claim or defense. 388

This amendment would reduce the burden of production by
removing the duty of disclosing the personal information of every actor
in a blockchain-thereby eliminating unnecessarily cumulative
information and the potential liability of other nodes not associated with
the litigant. 389 Additionally, by requiring the party to disclose the
quarriable data terms, it will allow the other party to grasp the magnitude
of potential document requests, which, in turn, will promote more
narrow FRCP 34 requests, ultimately resulting in potentially lower
3
discovery costs and the protection of sensitive information?.
In regard to the scope of discovery, FRCP 26(b)(2) should be
amended to include this subsection, after Subsection (B), as follows:

'

(C) Additional Limitations on Distributed Ledger Technology Based
Information. In addition to the limitations on electronically stored
information of Rule 26(b)(2)(B), a party need not provide discovery
for electronically stored information stored on distributed ledger
technology that meets or exceeds the age of required retention as
provided by a federal statute, federal administrative agency, these
rules, or the Supreme Court, unless otherwise agreed to by the party
from whom discovery is sought under this subsection.3 9
By limiting the date range of discoverable information, parties
utilizing the blockchain for data storage will be protected from unlimited
liability caused by the immutability of the blockchain.3 92 Additionally,
FRCP 37(e) should include a reference to this amendment stating that
"distributed ledger technology based records protected from discovery
under Rule 26(b)(2)(C) are not subject to claims of spoliation under this
rule." 39 3 This will ensure that those records that have met the age of

388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1).
See supra Part II.A; see FED. R. Cv. P. 26(a)(1).
See supra ParttIA; see FED. R. Cv. P. 26(a)(1).
See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2).
See supra Part III.A. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
See FED. R. CIv.P. 34(e).
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retention of the applicable agency are treated as though they
were destroyed.
In regard to document requests, the courts must think about the
implications associated with granting access to a person's private key;
therefore, FRCP 34 should include:
(d) Productionof Distributed Ledger Technology Based Information.
If a party requests access to a private key under Rule 34(a), the
responding party or a nonparty may object to or seek an order of
protection from the production of the private key according to the
procedures set out in Rule 26(c) or Rule 34(b)(2). In ruling on this
matter, the court shall take into account the interests of the parties, the
matter of controversy, the ability to obtain the information elsewhere,
and public policy.395
This amendment grants the court discretion to decide whether the party
requesting access to the private key actually needs it in proving its case,
or whether it is used as a fishing expedition that could ultimately
39 6
infringe upon other rights.
3 97
As has been established, a blockchain can fork. These forks can
be caused by a number of factors and can result in substantial
398
consequences-the most notable being loss of data. When viewed
from a FRCP 37(e) spoliation requirements perspective, a fork could be
devastating to document retrieval, especially when it occurs before
litigation is anticipated. 3 99 Therefore, the drafters should urge blockchain
users who have actual control over the software code and decision
making, like in cases of private blockchains, to document every decision
that was made regarding a fork-including the cause of the fork,
preventative efforts, damage control and preservation of information,
and other corporate governance records-to limit the potential of
sanctions levied by the court.400 Additionally, the drafters should also
urge the courts to view these actions from a reasonable person standard
4 0
due to the fact that forks are a normal occurrence. 1

394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra Part II.A. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(e).
FED. R. CIv. P. 34(e).
supra notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
supra Part I.B.2.d.
supra Part II.B.2.d; supra notes 298-301 and accompanying text.
supra notes 298-301 and accompanying text.
supra notes 298-301 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. CIv. P. 34(e).
supra Part I.B.2.d.
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2. Authentication of Blockchain Evidence
In order to ensure that evidence from a blockchain is authentic for
admissibility purposes, the federal legislature must work towards code
standardization.402 If the code meets a certain set of requirements,
litigants and the courts will not have to waste resources to prove that
blockchain evidence is authentic, as it will be self-authenticating under
FRE 902(10).4
Instead, litigants will only have to conduct an
authenticity analysis for actual documents pulled from the blockchain. 4 04
The suggested code standardization could require a number of things;
however, it should require that business organizations keep a Certificate
of Authorities to associate a user's public and private keys, and that
newly coded blockchains place limits on what data fields can be altered
by certain people.0 In other words, if there is a human error in data
input, the code could allow for an authorized person to make a corrective
transaction with the blockchain to fix the mistake, but limit what fields
or data entries that person may correct or supersede.406 This not only
accounts for human failure, but it helps to prevent fraud and ultimately
ensure authentic records.407
Unfortunately, code failure and malicious attacks are inevitable
with any kind of technology.4 8 With blockchain, these issues affect the
trustworthiness of a record, and due to this, the courts exercise judicial
discretion in order to determine whether it is necessary to conduct an
authentication analysis for records of a blockchain that was hacked
within the document retention period described in the previous
Subsection. 409 As was suggested to blockchain users affected by a fork,
blockchain users affected by a hack or a code failure should document
the course of action. 4 10 However, the issue of authenticity could be
mitigated by legislation declaring blockchain evidence to be admissible
(if it is not barred by relevancy concerns or judicial discretion).411

402.
403.
404.
405.

See
See
See
See

supra Part I.B.1. See
supra PartH.B.1. See
supra Part IB.. See
Shackelford & Myers,

infra Part IV.A.2.
FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(10).
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(10).
supra note 88, at 357. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(10).

406. See u/notathrowacc, How to Correct Wrong Informations on a Blockchain?, REDDIT (July
17, 2018, 7:44 AM), https://www.reddit.com/r/CryptoTechnology/comments/8zkers/how-to_c
orrect_wrong-informations on a blockchain (and accompanying feed of answers).

407. See supra Part III1B.
408. See supra Part II.B.2.d.
409. See supra Part T.B. See FED. R. EvID. 201.
410. See supra note 400 and accompanying text.
411. See Heather Morton, Blockchain State Legislation, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July
10, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/the-fundamentals-of-riskmanagement-and-insurance-viewed-through-the-lens-of-emerging-technology-webinar.aspx.
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Playing Blockchain Jenga

As blockchain-involved litigation floods the courts, one is able to
see the main problem surrounding this distributed ledger technology and
the relatively new form of electronic records-the transfer of data
between parties. 4 1 2A potential solution to this is to use a judicial
blockchain. 4 1 3 In theory, a court could create a private blockchain for the
parties to add their discoverable material into-creating a kind of
centralized database for discovery. 4 14 The underlying protocol could
encompass the use of smart contracts that could be coded to protect
privileges by revealing certain aspects of the data on the judicial
4 15
blockchain to a party only if that party meets specific conditions.
Cross-chain technology could potentially pull the data that matches
predetermined parameters from a party's blockchain and put it into the
judicial blockchain.416
One can think about cross-chain technology as playing three games
of Jenga simultaneously. 4 1 7On the left side, there is Jenga A-which
represents the plaintiff's blockchain; on the right, Jenga C-the
defendant's blockchain; in the center, Jenga B-the judicial blockchain;
and in between each blockchain is the code for the cross-chain
technology. 4 1 8 The code takes a certain block from Jenga A, representing
a particular piece of information, like the plaintiff's losses, without
destroying the tower, that is, the chain, and puts it into Jenga B, and does
the same for the defendant's block/information in Jenga C. 4 19 Not every

UI.A.1,2.b.

412. See supra Parts
413. See infra Part IV.B. To clarify, this sentence is not suggesting that there is a different type
of blockchain, but rather, that the courts should utilize this technology for litigation purposes. See
infra Part IV.B.
414. Adrian Clarke, Creating Connectivity in the Blockchain Ecosystem, HACKERNOON (June

20, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/creating-connectivity-in-the-blockchain-ecosystem-dfl6

9

a

29

85. At this point in time, blockchain interconnectivity has not been proven to work; however, it has
been hypothesized that with the development of a workable application programing interface,
"companies can connect the blockchain to transaction records or databases to create verified,
transmittable records ... private blockchain's [sic] can connect to public chains to enhance their
ability to receive digital payments or other value transfers." Id.
415. See supra Part HB.2.c.
416. See POA Network, Cross-Chain Bridges: Paving the Way to Internet of Blockchains,
MEDIUM (Nov. 15,2017),https://medium.com/poa-network/cross-chain-bridges-paving-the-way-to-

internet-of-blockchains-422ac94bc2e5.
417. See infra notes 418-20 and accompanying text. The concept of Jenga is to remove "one
block . . . from any level of the tower ... and plac[e] it on the topmost level in order to complete it"
POKONOBE ASSOCIATES,
Jenga: About,
See
over.
tower
the
knocking
without
https://www.jenga.com/about.php (last visited Jan. 25, 2020) [hereinafter Jenga Rules].
418. See Jenga Rules, supra note 417; supra notes 413-16 and accompanying text.
419. See supra notes 413-18 and accompanying text.
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block from Jenga A and Jenga C gets added to Jenga B-the code is
selective with which block it takes.420
This not only creates an easier process of information sharing
among parties, but it ensures that any limits on discovery are adhered
to. 421 When using cross-chain technology, sensitive information like
private keys or privileges are protected with a heightened level of
security; the data range of discovery can be customized on a case-bycase basis, and in the process of pulling the information off the chain,
the code will check for and ensure that the data put into the judicial
blockchain is an exact match of that pulled from the party's chain.422
V.

CONCLUSION

Technology development will not wait for regulators to play
catch-up.423 Ever since the creation of Bitcoin in 2009, many companies
across various industries have considered the use of this new and
emerging technology for their own business needs.424 As the
implementation of blockchain across numerous sectors of business
begins to grow, the legal consequences of this distributed ledger system
are revealed. 4 2 5 The recent amendments to the FRCP and FRE have
acknowledged the issues surrounding ESI in the civil litigation process
and have attempted to amend the rules to reflect the recent changes in
storage technology. 4 2 6However, the drafters failed to account for a
database that allows users to permanently record information by creating
a system of encrypted blocks that are interconnected in a ledgerotherwise known as a blockchain.427 Given this, many litigants who have
implemented blockchain technology may be exposed to discovery
hardships, the production of which could challenge the current status of
admissible evidence.428 In order to fix these issues, the legislature must
alter the rules of discovery and evidence in order to limit the amount of
discoverable data and declare the authenticity of such stored data via
blockchain.429 Separately, the legislature should implement certain
guidelines by which a corporation creating their own blockchain or a

420. See Jenga Rules, supra note 417; supra notes 413-19 and accompanying text.
421. See POA Network, supra note 416.
422. See id.
423. See supra notes 378-79 and accompanying text.
424. See supra Part I.A.2.
425. See supra Part If.
426. See supra Part H.C.
427. See supra Part III.
428. See supra Parts II.A, B.
429. See supra Part IV.
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blockchain service provider must include in the programming code, and
should encourage the use of independent third parties to facilitate the
discovery process when one of the parties uses blockchain to
0
store data. 43
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